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Abstract
The spread of COVID-19 across the U.S. in the months since January 2020 and the
worry of an impending strain on the medical system led to concerted efforts to “flatten
the curve” by encouraging individuals to stay at home and maintain social distance.
Since then, many individual U.S. counties and entire states have implemented
stay-at-home mandates in order to reduce the speed of contagion and delay or
ultimately reduce the influx of patients seeking medical treatment for COVID-19
symptoms. This study uses variation in statewide adoption of stay-at-home mandates
and observed reductions in activity away from home, measured by changes in average
distance traveled, visits to non-essential businesses, and human encounters per day to
investigate the linkage between reduced travel and COVID-19 health outcomes. We use
data on changes in mobility patterns across the U.S. since the onset of COVID-19 to
discuss evidence of overall reductions in daily travel; characterize the direct impact of
stay-at-home mandates on behavior; and link travel reductions to health outcomes. We
estimate a 5pp reduction in average distance traveled, a 6pp decline in non-essential
visits, and a 236pp reduction in human encounters per day once a stay-at-home
mandate is implemented. We find evidence that these observed changes ultimately
improve health outcomes, as reductions of these magnitudes in the two weeks prior to
implementation of statewide stay-at-home mandates are associated with 9 fewer daily
deaths for the average early adopter state with a population of 20.2 million (-3.0 from
reduced distances traveled, -1.2 from reduced non-essential visits, and -4.8 from reduced
human encounters estimated). Using the central EPA value of a statistical life estimate
of $7.4 million, this corresponds to a benefit of $66.6 million per day attributable to
avoided COVID-19 deaths – equivalent to a benefit of $932.4 million per state for a
two-week long mandate. Our findings provide evidence that states’ stay-at-home
ordinances are having the intended effect of reducing travel and ultimately mitigating
some of the negative health consequences of COVID-19 and reflect an important policy
tool in the fight against pandemic.
Author summary
Many U.S. counties and states have incurred considerable current economic and social
costs by implementing stay-at-home mandates intended to reduce the spread of
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COVID-19. Proponents of the mandates argue that it will “flatten the curve” and
reduce future costs and medical system strain, but the magnitude of benefits is largely
uncertain. In this paper, we provide the first empirical estimate of the effect of
stay-at-home mandates on actual travel behavior and social distancing. We find that
residents on average listen to state policies and substantially reduce their travel activity
and reduce physical interactions with others. Connecting past reductions in travel
activity to COVID-19 health outcomes, we provide evidence that, importantly,
decreased travel and increased social distancing in the past is associated with future
reductions in hospitalizations and deaths from COVID-19. We estimate large financial
benefits due solely to avoiding COVID-19 deaths, which is only one of several health
benefits associated with stay-at-home mandates. To our knowledge, we are the first to
show the extent of behavioral responses and magnitude of potential benefits to these
early policies.
Introduction 1
Since December 2019, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) has spread 2
rapidly around the world and in the U.S., prompting dramatic policy responses. Local, 3
state, and national governments around the world face an extensive set of policy 4
instruments with which to fight the pandemic and limit the virus’ impact on their 5
constituents. As many regions have exhibited exponential growth in coronavirus 6
cases [1], policymakers are increasingly implementing aggressive stay-at-home mandates 7
to reduce transmission through human interaction and “flatten the curve” [2]. As of 8
March 31, the U.S. had the highest number of confirmed cases (more than 67% more 9
than the next country) with at least one resident of every state affected [3]. Improving 10
our understanding of how existing stay-at-home policies reduce travel activity and 11
ultimately mitigate negative health consequences of the pandemic will help local and 12
state policy makers determine the optimal policies for helping “flatten the curve” and 13
quell the spread of COVID-19. To investigate this, we combine data on human mobility 14
with state policy variation and health outcomes, allowing us to determine the reductions 15
in distance traveled, visits to non-essential businesses, and human encounters, and 16
ultimately relate these to changes in hospitalizations and deaths directly attributable to 17
stay-at-home mandates. 18
While the benefits of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI), such as quarantining 19
infected households, closing schools, and banning social events or large gatherings to 20
reduce infection rates has largely been informed by mathematical models [4], some 21
anecdotal and historical evidence supports their efficacy. In California’s San Francisco 22
Bay Area, the first area of the country to implement stay-at-home mandates, doctors 23
reported “fewer cases than expected” after two weeks of social distancing [5]. Analysis 24
of internet-connected thermometers suggest that new fever rates on March 23 were 25
below those at the start of the month, while state hospitalization rates showed a 26
commensurate decline in growth rates [6]. Washington state officials reported similar 27
reductions in COVID-19 transmission as a result of the state’s containment 28
strategies [7]. Exploration of death rates and NPI rollout in 17 U.S. cities during the 29
1918 influenza pandemic support these claims, finding that implementation of multiple 30
social distancing practices intended to reduce infectious contacts between persons early 31
in the outbreak led to 50% lower peak death rates and flatter epidemic curves relative 32
to cities that did not implement such policies [4]. Gaining insight into the effectiveness 33
of these stay-at-home mandates is critical for understanding the benefit of making the 34
considerable economic sacrifices required to enact such policies. Even before mandates 35
limited economic activity, GDP forecasts suggested an economic contraction in the U.S. 36
five times greater than previous predictions [8]. Concerns over these costs prompted 37
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comments from the executive branch regarding relaxation of restrictions and allowing 38
non-essential businesses to reopen [9], prompting opposition from public health 39
experts [10,11] and economists [12,13]. 40
Recent simulations provide further insight into the benefits of social distancing. 41
While epidemiological models of the U.K. and U.S. suggest that techniques for 42
mitigating exposure of those most at risk may drastically reduce peak load on the 43
healthcare system and cut COVID-19 deaths by half, such techniques on their own 44
might not be enough to prevent the healthcare system from being overwhelmed. Some 45
argue that, in this case, a combination of social distancing, self-quarantine of infected, 46
and suspension of schools would need to be maintained until a vaccine is available to 47
prevent rebound [14]. Other experts call for widespread testing coupled with digital 48
contact tracing as a means to reduce viral spread while minimizing harmful social and 49
economic side-effects [15]. Simulations based on a moderate mitigation policy 50
(comprised of 7-day isolation following any symptoms, a 14-day quarantine for the 51
household, and social distancing for all citizens over age 70) implemented in late March 52
find that such policies reduce potential U.S. deaths by 1.76 million deaths [16]. Given 53
that this simulated policy is less stringent and maintained for a shorter duration than 54
many of the policies currently observed, the actual benefits (either directly from 55
reduced COVID-19 deaths or indirectly due to decreased transmission of other illnesses) 56
from existing stay-at-home mandates could be substantially larger. 57
This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing the first empirical 58
evidence of stay-at-home policies’ effectiveness. These mandates combine closures of 59
non-essential businesses with instructions for all residents to remain at home except for 60
the purchase of necessities (i.e. groceries or medicine), with the goal of limiting 61
“unnecessary person-to-person contact” [17] and to “mitigate the impact of 62
COVID-19” [18]. We examine changes in travel behavior in response to these social 63
distancing policies due to the pandemic across the entire United States, estimate the 64
portion of these reductions attributable to early state stay-at-home mandates, and 65
correlate reduced travel behavior with changes in health outcomes. 66
To estimate the effect of stay-at-home policies on distance traveled, we use data on 67
changes in average distance traveled, visits to non-essential businesses, and unique 68
human encounters per square kilometer by day and by state [19] relative to the 69
pre-COVID-19 baseline. This allows us to estimate a statistical model that isolates the 70
effect of mandates by comparing differences before and after mandate implementation 71
and between early-adopting and control states. Identification of the stay-at-home policy 72
effect originates from residual variation in changes to average distance traveled relative 73
to a day-to-day flexible trend and between mandate and non-mandate states. Using this 74
panel fixed effects control structure, we test whether states’ stay-at-home policies induce 75
significant changes in mobility and human encounters by day in the United States once 76
the mandate is implemented, relative to the change in non-mandate states. We find 77
evidence of reductions in travel and increased social distance in response to early 78
stay-at-home mandates. We estimate a 5 percentage point reduction in average distance 79
traveled, a 6 percentage point decline in non-essential visits, and a 236 percentage point 80
reduction in human encounters per day once a stay-at-home mandate is implemented. 81
These estimated “mandate effects” are robust to the choice of comparison states, and 82
represent large additional declines relative to average trends in the sample period. 83
Finally, we merge the daily behavior changes with data on changes in the number of 84
daily state-level deaths and hospitalizations from COVID-19 [20] to provide an early 85
indication of whether current health outcomes are informed by past behavioral 86
responses. We estimate lagged specifications to test whether changes one and two weeks 87
prior (7 and 14 days) in the three mobility measures we look at (distance traveled, 88
non-essential travel, and human encounter rates) have an effect on current health 89
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outcomes, controlling for day-to-day changes common to all states and state-specific 90
factors affecting health outcomes, and distinguishing between mandate and 91
non-mandate states. We find evidence that reduced travel and increased social distance 92
do ultimately affect health outcomes, with reduced daily COVID-19 deaths of 0.3, 0.01, 93
and 0.001 per day for a one percentage point reduction in average daily travel, 94
non-essential visits, and human encounters. These correspond to a daily benefit of $66.9 95
million for the observed “mandate effect,” or $932.4 million from avoided deaths after a 96
two week stay-at-home mandate. 97
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper providing evidence of health benefits 98
associated with improved social distancing and reduced travel activity resulting from 99
stay-at-home mandates. We contribute to the overall understanding of the direct health 100
benefits of current COVID-19 policies and provide evidence that these policies are 101
having the intended effect of mitigating negative health consequences from the current 102
pandemic. 103
Materials and methods 104
Mobility data 105
We obtain travel activity and social distancing data from the analytics company 106
Unacast [19]. To understand how well different communities are social distancing, 107
Unacast uses cellular location data for 15-17 million identifiers per day to construct 108
three measures of behavior in response to COVID-19 policies. Each measure is 109
aggregated to the state by day level and is defined as the daily percentage point change 110
relative to that weekday’s average for the pre-COVID-19 period of the four weeks prior 111
to March 8. While all data is published directly to their Social Distancing Dashboard in 112
the form of figures and maps [21], we obtained the balanced panel of state by day 113
observations for the period of February 24 through April 4, 2020 directly from Unacast. 114
The three measures we use together paint a comprehensive picture of behavior changes 115
in response to state stay-at-home mandates. The first measure we use is the change in 116
average distance traveled ( ˙ADT ), which captures changes in both the number of trips 117
and the length of trips taken outside the home. Reductions in ADT following mandate 118
implementation would reflect compliance on average with states’ guidance to work from 119
and stay at home except for essential activities. The second measure is the change in 120
visits to non-essential businesses, defined as Non Essential Visits ( ˙NEV ). To the extent 121
that non-essential businesses are closed following stay-at-home mandates, we expect to 122
see reductions in the number of trips residents take to these types of retail or service 123
businesses. Finally, we use changes in the rate of human encounters ( ˙ENC) as a 124
measure of social distancing. Calculated as the rate of unique human encounters per 125
square kilometer relative to the national median over the four weeks prior to March 8, 126
we further normalize the rate of encounters as the change relative to the state’s mean 127
change from the national average for the period February 24 to March 8 to match 128
measurement of the other activity variables.1 129
The change in distance traveled measure we use displays very high correlations with 130
travel data produced by other sources. To investigate the validity of our measures, we 131
compare our ˙ADT values for two early-mandate states (CA and NY) and two 132
randomly-selected control states (CO and UT) to equivalent measures obtained from 133
Google’s COVID-19 Community Mobility Report for the relative change for retail and 134
recreation travel [22]. For California, we observe a correlation of 0.9689, while for New 135
York we observe a correlation of 0.9821. The activity measures remain highly correlated 136
1For data quality reasons, we drop observations for Washington D.C. from our analysis of human
encounter rates.
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when considering the randomly-selected control states, with high levels of correlation in 137
both Colorado (0.9573) and Utah (0.9562). These strong relationships across data 138
providers suggest that our results are indicative of general mobility patterns and not 139
spurious results arising from anomalies of our chosen data source. 140
Stay-at-home mandate data 141
To denote periods before or after a state implemented a “stay at home order”, we 142
obtain the date each statewide policy was issued [2] for all fifty states and the District 143
of Columbia. We define our early adopters as the first four states to implement a 144
stay-at-home mandate: California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York. The comparison 145
group of interest is therefore the remaining 46 states. For robustness in some tables we 146
drop observations for states that adopted state mandates in the three days following 147
New York from the control group. The observed stay-at-home mandates all consist of a 148
mix of specific non-pharmaceutical interventions; each observed policy closes or places 149
considerable limits on non-essential businesses and requires residents to stay at home 150
except for essential activities. Essential services include grocery stores, gas stations, 151
pharmacies, banks, laundry services, and business essential to government function [31]. 152
Throughout this paper we refer to all mandates that implement this combination of 153
policies as a “stay-at-home mandate.” 154
Health outcome data 155
We obtain information on coronavirus test outcomes along with hospitalizations and 156
deaths from COVID-19 by state from the COVID Tracking Project [20]. Published 157
values are obtained directly from the respective public health authorities, supplemented 158
with additions from press conferences or trusted news sources. Current numbers were 159
obtained daily to ensure that our analysis stays up to date with any reporting changes 160
or new data. From the test count data, we create the daily share positive variable as the 161
number of new positive results divided by the total number of new tests conducted in a 162
given state on a given day. We scale the change in hospitalizations and deaths by state 163
population in millions. We obtain population data by state from the 2010 U.S. 164
Decennial Census [32]. Prior to the implementation of stay-at-home policies, we find no 165
statistical evidence of differential trends for early-adopter states relative to the rest of 166
the US. Conducting a difference-in-means test for the two groups, we fail to reject the 167
null hypothesis that the average change in distance traveled (t-statistic of -1.67) and 168
deaths per million (t = 0.72) each day are different for CA, IL, NJ, and NY relative to 169
other states.2 We reject the null hypothesis of no difference in means for the share of 170
positive tests (t = 4.11), which we take as further evidence that testing protocols and 171
volume differ extensively from state to state. 172
Model 173
Difference-in-differences statistical model 174
To determine the effect of stay-at-home mandates, we estimate the following model: 175
˙ADT sd = α+ βMandatesd + γs + δd + εsd (1)
Here s is the state, d is the date, α a constant term, Mandate an indicator equal to one 176
if state s has a stay-at-home mandate in place on date d and zero otherwise, γ a vector 177
of state fixed effects, and δ a vector of date fixed effects. γ controls for time-invariant 178
2We do not conduct a comparable test for hospitalization rates due to the lack of consistent
hospitalization data across states in the weeks prior to March 19.
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characteristics of state s that affect travel behavior, while δ controls for day-to-day 179
changes in average distance traveled that are common to all states and are measured 180
relative to the baseline date of February 28. ε is an idiosyncratic error comprised of 181
unobserved determinants of changes in average distance traveled that are not controlled 182
for by the variables specified in the linear Eq 1. The dependent variable ˙ADT sd 183
measures the percentage point change in average distance traveled per day in state s on 184
day d relative to pre-COVID-19 activity levels. A value of −20 conveys a decline in 185
activity for state s of twenty percentage points relative to typical resident behavior prior 186
to changes in work or social policies. The coefficient β measures the difference in the 187
change in average daily travel for states that implement the stay-at-home mandate 188
relative to the change in activity in states that do not implement such policies, after 189
controlling for state and time-varying factors that also correlate with changes in daily 190
activity. We estimate the model in Eq 1 using a daily state-level panel data set on 191
changes in average distance traveled by state and day. We also specify models like Eq 1 192
using as dependent variables the change in non-essential travel ( ˙NEV ) and the change 193
in human encounter rate ( ˙ENC) given by 194
˙NEV sd = α+βMandatesd+γs+δd+εsd and ˙ENCsd = α+βMandatesd+γs+δd+εsd
(2)
Our method allows us to identify the relationship between mandates to stay-at-home 195
and daily changes in each of the three measures (each in turn, average distance traveled, 196
non-essential visits, and encounter rates) while also explicitly controlling for other 197
confounding factors that are specific to each state or date. The share of local population 198
previously working from home or employed in specific industries are controlled for with 199
γ, while day-to-day changes in activity common to all states – motivated by new 200
information on the virus’ spread and nationwide media coverage or federal appeals to 201
social distancing – are controlled for through δ. The mandate effect β is identified 202
under the assumption that, after controlling for the state and date, stay-at-home 203
mandates are as good as random. Equivalently, there are no time-varying characteristics 204
of states that affect both individuals’ average travel behavior and the probability of that 205
state enacting a stay-at-home mandate. Standard errors of the estimated parameters 206
are clustered by state to account for variation in state policies potentially affecting the 207
magnitude of the error term ε. 208
Model for health outcomes and lagged changes in mobility and lagged 209
encounter rates 210
We consider several lagged specifications to empirically test whether changes in mobility 211
one and two weeks (7 and 14 days) prior have an effect on current health outcomes, 212
controlling for day-to-day changes common to all states and state-specific factors 213
affecting health outcomes, and distinguishing between mandate and non-mandate states. 214
Recall that we have data for the changes in average distance traveled ( ˙ADT ), the 215
change in non-essential visits ( ˙NEV ), and the change in the rate of unique human 216
encounters by day and by state relative to national baseline rates. We consider two 217
direct health outcomes: daily new Covid 19 deaths and hospitalizations by state, 218
measured per million residents. Let Hsd be the daily health outcome reported for state 219
s in day d, which is given by 220
Hsd = α+ γs + δd + β1j ˙ADT s,d−j + β2j ˙ADT s,d−jMs + εsd, (3)
where j = 7, and 14 so that ˙ADT s,d−7 and ˙ADT s,d−14 are the changes in the average 221
distance traveled in the previous week and 2 weeks previously, respectively. 222
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Next, we separately relate the above health outcomes to changes in visits to 223
non-essential businesses one and two weeks prior, namely with ˙NEV s,d−7 and 224
˙NEV s,d−14 by specifying again for j = 7, 14 the model 225
Hsd = α+ γs + δd + β1j ˙NEV s,d−j + β2j ˙NEV s,d−jMs + εsd. (4)
Finally, we consider past weeks’ changes in the unique human encounter rate, namely 226
˙ENCs,d−7 and ˙ENCs,d−14 on health outcomes, for j = 7, 14, given by the model 227
Hsd = α+ γs + δd + β1j ˙ENCs,d−j + β2j ˙ENCs,d−jMs + εsd. (5)
In each of the empirical analyses, the coefficient α is a constant, γs state fixed effects 228
controlling for time-invariant state characteristics that affect health outcomes (measured 229
relative to the baseline day of March 9), and δd date fixed effects controlling for 230
common time shocks. Ms is an indicator that is equal to 1 if a state s is an early 231
stay-at-home mandate state and equal to zero otherwise, and εsd are unobserved 232
determinants of health outcomes that vary over time within a given state. In Eq 3, the 233
coefficient on ˙ADT s,d−14 captures the estimated effects of reducing activity two weeks 234
prior for non-mandate states. ˙ADT s,d−14Ms captures the differential effect of a change 235
in average distance traveled 14 days prior on current health outcome Hsd for early 236
stay-at-home states. Inclusion of additional lags for one week prior allows us to estimate 237
a lagged long term impact of reducing activity; in this case, the long term impact of 238
changes in activity is given by the sum of the two lagged variable coefficients of the 239
lagged changes in average distance traveled one and two weeks prior. Similar 240
interpretation applies to the models in Eq 4 and 5. 241
Results 242
Across the United States, COVID-19 upended daily routines. As a result of layoffs, 243
revised work-from-home guidelines, school closures, family needs, and state policies, 244
travel behavior has changed dramatically in the U.S. over the last two months. Figure 1 245
plots over time the changes in population-weighted average distance traveled ( ˙ADT ), 246
visits to non-essential businesses ( ˙NEV ), and the unique human encounter rate ( ˙ENC) 247
per day for all U.S. states, measured as the percent change relative to typical 248
pre-COVID-19 levels. The solid line plots the average for the first four states to 249
implement mandatory stay-at-home policies: California (implemented March 19) [33], 250
Illinois (March 21) [34], New Jersey (March 21) [35], and New York (March 22) [36]. 251
The dotted line plots the average for the 15 states that adopt stay-at-home mandates 252
later in the sample period while the dashed line plots the daily average for the remaining 253
31 states who had yet to adopt a stay-at-home mandate by end-of-day March 25.3 In 254
Table 1 we report results using both types of control states as our comparison group, 255
while in Table 2 we report results both including and excluding the late adopter states. 256
Travel behavior in late February and through the first week of March looks largely 257
typical for all measures, with small fluctuations relative to normal activity levels for all 258
states. Beginning the week of March 9, residents across the country began reducing 259
their distances traveled, trips to non-essential businesses, and encounters with others. 260
Residents of early-adoption states decrease travel levels earlier in the week in 261
comparison to control states: population-weighted mean changes for CA, IL, NJ, and 262
NY compared to other states are between 2.4 and 5.8 percentage points lower for 263
3Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin all implement similar stay-at-
home mandates between March 23 and March 26. Massachusetts adopted a stay-at-home advisory,
recommending but not requiring that residents stay home.
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Fig 1. Each series represents the change in each day’s outcome relative to
pre-COVID-19 levels for the given states. The solid line corresponds to the
population-weighted average of states that had implemented stay-at-home mandates by
end-of-day March 22 (California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York) while the dotted
line plots the population-weighted average for the 13 states that adopt stay-at-home
mandates from March 23-25, and the dashed line for all remaining states. The first
panel plots changes in average distance traveled, the second changes in unique human
encounters per square kilometer, and the third changes in visits to non-essential
businesses. The gray bars designate weekend days while the vertical line indicates
March 19, the date the first state policy was implemented in California.
distances traveled, 1.6 and 8.4 percentage points lower for visits to non-essential 264
businesses, and between 17.2 and 116.9 percentage points lower for human encounter 265
rate during the work week of March 9-13. While distances traveled in all groups decline 266
on weekends and rebound during work weeks, travel activity changes exhibit a roughly 267
linear decline through April 4 for all states. Human encounter rates fall in all states 268
through the weekend of March 21-22, with the steepest decline for early adopters, 269
followed by later adopters and then the smallest reduction for remaining states. 270
Although changes in visits to non-essential businesses are the most similar across the 271
three groups, early adopter states exhibit slightly larger magnitude reductions in 272
comparison to the other two groups after March 15. 273
Following the implementation of state stay-at-home mandates, the differences in 274
travel activity changes and social distancing behavior between the groups grow larger. 275
The difference in population-weighted mean ˙ADT for early adopters and other states 276
for the work week of March 16 to 20 averages -8.2 and peaks at -9.6 percentage points, 277
with the ˙NEV difference averaging -8.3 and peaking at -9.8 percentage points and 278
˙ENC averaging -128.2 and peaking at -139.6 percentage points. The mean differences 279
increase further in magnitude during the work week of March 23-27, growing to -9.6 for 280
˙ADT , -9.0 for ˙NEV , and -149.0 for ˙ENC after all early-adopter mandates became 281
April 13, 2020 8/22
active. Interestingly, the reductions in human encounter rates stabilize across all three 282
states shortly after the first state mandates come into effect. After March 19, unique 283
human encounter rates remain nearly parallel in all three groups, with human encounter 284
rates stabilizing around 100 percentage points below later adopters, who are themselves 285
60-70 percentage points below other states. This provides preliminary evidence that 286
decreases in travel activity and in-person social interactions responded sharply around 287
the first stay-at-home mandates and stabilized shortly thereafter as residents across the 288
country adjusted to their new lives at home. 289
Effect of stay-at-home mandates on daily travel 290
While Figure 1 provides preliminary evidence that residents across the country have 291
drastically reduced travel activity and engaged in social distancing in response to 292
COVID-19 and that residents of early mandate states differentially modified their travel 293
behavior, it is difficult to visually isolate the share of the difference attributable to 294
states’ stay-at-home mandates from time trends and characteristics of state residents 295
and policies. To investigate the role of stay-at-home mandates further, we next present 296
results of empirical specifications designed to isolate the effect of stay-at-home policies 297
on changes in average distance traveled ( ˙ADT ) using data from all U.S. states. In the 298
empirical regression approaches that follow, we begin by presenting the results of the 299
linear fixed effects in Eq 1 model in Table 1. 300
Table 1. Effect of early stay-at-home mandates on changes in average daily
distance traveled
˙ADT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Early SAH x Post-Mandate −29.235∗∗∗ −6.367∗∗∗ −6.602∗∗∗ −5.148∗∗
(2.489) (1.690) (2.387) (2.204)
After First Mandate −32.843∗∗∗ −32.827∗∗∗
(0.459) (1.124)
Early SAH State −3.264∗∗∗
(1.012)
Constant −16.959∗∗∗ −3.720∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.298)
State Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Date Fixed Effects No No No Yes
N 2,091 2,091 2,091 2,091
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.730 0.776 0.911
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These models estimate the effect of early
stay-at-home mandates on travel activity. The dependent variable is the change
in average distance traveled per day for the same day of the week relative to the
four weeks before March 8 (pre-COVID-19 time). Early SAH x Post−Mandate
equals one in early mandate states once a mandate is in effect, and is equal to
zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Table 1 reports the results for the estimation of Eq 1 and is organized into four 301
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columns, where in column (1) we present results from the ordinary least squares model 302
of changes in average distance traveled regressed on a constant and an indicator for 303
mandates being in effect in the first four adoption states. In this naive specification, we 304
find that a stay-at-home policy is correlated with a reduction of average distance 305
traveled by a significant 29% relative to pre-COVID-19 levels and control states. In 306
column (2) we add two additional controls: an indicator for the four states (CA, IL, NJ, 307
and NY) that implemented a stay-at-home mandate first (Early SAH State), and an 308
indicator for all days following implementation of the first state mandate on March 19 309
(After F irst Mandate). In column (2) we find that, on average, early-adoption states 310
experienced an additional drop in average distance traveled of 3.3% prior to March 19, 311
statistically significant at the 1% level. Once stay-at-home mandates were rolled out on 312
March 19, all states significantly reduce their average distance traveled by an additional 313
32.8%. In mandate states post-policy implementation, we estimate a statistically 314
significant additional decline of 6.4%. The estimated mandate effect is statistically 315
indistinguishable when state fixed effects are added in column (3). Finally, in column 316
(4) we estimate the staggered difference-in-differences model of Eq 1. 317
Effect of stay-at-home mandates on non-essential visits and 318
human encounter rates 319
Figure 1 provided evidence that residents across the country have reduced travel 320
activity and engaged in social distancing; to what extent are these reductions driven by 321
state-level policies? To isolate the share of these differences attributable to states’ 322
stay-at-home mandates, we present the results of the linear fixed effects model of Eq 2 323
in Table 2. 324
Table 2. Effect of early stay-at-home mandates on travel behavior and social distancing
Distance Traveled Non-Essential Visits Human Encounters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early SAH x Post-Mandate −5.148∗∗ −5.513∗∗ −5.763∗∗∗ −6.546∗∗∗ −235.871∗ −234.522∗
(2.204) (2.349) (1.623) (1.749) (124.687) (125.555)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Group All Late All Late All Late
N 2,091 1,558 2,091 1,558 2,050 1,517
Adjusted R2 0.911 0.918 0.971 0.970 0.687 0.682
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These models estimate the effect of early stay-at-home
mandates on travel activity and social distancing behavior. The treatment effects are measured
in terms of changes relative to a state’s pre-COVID-19 levels. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level. A control group of “All” uses all 46 states and D.C. as the comparison group, while
“Late” omits the 15 states that adopted stay-at-home policies between March 23 and March 25.
Column (1) of Table 2 repeats the estimates for column (4) of Table 1. In column (2) 325
we estimate the changes in average distance model using a different group of control 326
states, now omitting observations for all 15 states that adopted policies between March 327
23 and March 25. This “Late” control group allows us to observe whether residents in 328
the states next to adopt mandates were markedly different than states that adopted 329
even later or not at all. Columns (3)-(6) repeat the exercise for changes in non-essential 330
visits and human encounter rates. 331
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Across all columns and control groups, we estimate large magnitude changes in 332
travel activity due to stay-at-home mandates. In column (2) we see that the 333
stay-at-home mandate effect for the change in average distance traveled is robust to the 334
alternative control structure, with the point estimate growing 0.4 percentage points 335
more negative in comparison to column (1). Turning to estimates for changes in visits 336
to non-essential businesses, we observe treatment effect estimates of -5.8 and -6.5 for 337
columns (3) and (4), respectively, with both statistically significant beyond the 1% level. 338
That is, once a mandate is implemented, we estimate a 5.8 percentage point reduction 339
in the change in average visits to non-essential businesses relative to control states. 340
When we use only late or non-adopters as control states, the point estimate is larger in 341
magnitude, with an estimated mandate effect of a 6.5 percentage point reduction. 342
Turning next to changes in human encounter rates in columns (5) and (6), we once 343
again observe a relatively large response to stay-at-home mandates. We estimate 344
reductions between 234.5 and 235.9 percentage points once a mandate is implemented, 345
indicating that median unique human encounters per square kilometer declined by an 346
additional 235% in response to early stay-at-home mandates. However, these results are 347
noisier than previous findings, displaying statistical significance to only the 10% level in 348
both columns. This is likely a reflection of the increased variability in this measure both 349
within and between states, as indicated by the lower Adjusted R-squared for columns 350
(5) and (6). 351
The variation in the data used to identify the policy effect in Table 2 originates from 352
residual variation in changes to travel activity, non-essential visits, and human 353
encounter rates relative to a day-to-day flexible trend and time-invariant state 354
characteristics. Identification of unbiased mandate effects relies on the assumption that, 355
after controlling for time patterns and state characteristics in this way, deviations in 356
time of early states’ mandates are as good as random. Put another way, we require that 357
there are no state characteristics that vary day-to-day within our sample period that are 358
correlated with both adoption of stay-at-home mandates and residents’ travel activity. 359
Figure 2 plots the corresponding date fixed effects over time for columns (1), (3), 360
and (5) of Table 2. The point estimates in the first panel correspond to changes in mean 361
distance traveled for each sample period day relative to the change on February 24 (the 362
omitted date indicator in the model). The middle panel presents equivalent estimates 363
for the change in unique human encounters, while the third panel reports findings for 364
the change in non-essential visits. The vertical bars correspond to the 95% confidence 365
interval around each point estimate. Each point can be interpreted as the relative 366
change in the expected outcome, conditional on the state and whether a mandate is in 367
effect. 368
Broadly, all three panels reflect the patterns observed in Figure 1. While both ˙ADT 369
and ˙NEV display cyclic patterns during the weeks, a discontinuous drop is observed on 370
March 20, once California’s stay-at-home mandate entered into effect. Beginning the 371
week of March 23, these patterns begin to stabilize, suggesting travel behavior has 372
reached new equilibrium paths. Turning to the middle panel, corresponding to date 373
fixed effects from column (5) of Table 2, we observe a more gradual reduction and faster 374
stabilization in the human encounter rate. Unlike the travel indicators, we see no 375
perceivable statistical differences in the rate of unique human encounter changes once 376
states began adopting stay-at-home mandates. The encounter rate remains remarkably 377
stable for the period March 19 to April 4, suggesting human encounter rates are less 378
variable within-week in comparison to the two measures of travel activity. 379
Take away 380
Taken together, we find that the mandates cause significant reductions in both the 381
average distance traveled and also the non-essential visits. Additionally, we provide 382
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Fig 2. Date fixed effects from the generalized difference-in-differences mode in eq 1l.
Each point is the estimated coefficient for a date indicator variable and the vertical line
denotes the 95% confidence interval, and is interpreted as the difference in the change in
average distance traveled vs pre-COVID-19 levels relative to the change on February 28.
The light gray bars signify weekend days.
evidence that residents of mandate states do increase social distancing behavior in 383
response to their states’ policies, and do so at a greater rate than individuals not 384
subject to such policies. 385
Once a mandate is implemented, we observe a 5.1 percentage point reduction in the 386
change in average distance traveled relative to all control states, and a 5.8 percentage 387
point reduction in the change in non-essential visits relative to control states. Given 388
that the mean (median) change in distance traveled for the entire sample period is 389
−17.8 (−13.8) percentage points, this corresponds to a 29% (37%) additional reduction. 390
Comparing changes in non-essential visits to its mean of -29.1 (median of -22.0), these 391
mandate effects correspond to additional reductions of 20% (26%). As travel activity is 392
a main source of social interaction beyond one’s immediate family [39] and travel to 393
non-work locations increases the probability of co-location with others [40], these 394
reductions in distances traveled likely reflect commensurate decreases in physical 395
interactions with those outside of one’s immediate family. Distance traveled is positively 396
linked to an increased number of social trips across all modes of transportation [41], 397
suggesting that the observed decreases likely reflect a decline in unique trips away from 398
home as well. Our estimates for changes in unique human encounters reflect these 399
previous findings, indicating considerable reductions between 234.5 and 235.9 percentage 400
points. Compared to the mean (median) reduction during the sample period of -77.6 401
(-22.9), our estimated mandate response reflects an additional decline of 302% (1024%). 402
This provides preliminary evidence that stay-at-home mandates are having the intended 403
effect of inducing greater social distancing than would occur otherwise, reducing 404
opportunities for communication of COVID-19 from infected to uninfected residents. 405
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Early signs of flattening the curve due to stay-at-home 406
mandates 407
While stay-at-home mandates reducing travel activity and promoting increased social 408
distancing behavior provides evidence that individuals are listening to their states’ 409
ordinances, what matters from a public health perspective is the impact of these 410
mandates (and the ensuing behavioral changes) on the spread of and outcomes from 411
COVID-19. Merging the daily state-level changes in the average distance traveled [19], 412
with the daily mobility data on changes in the number of deaths and hospitalizations 413
per state [20], we are able to provide early indications of whether the stay-at-home 414
mandates are having their intended effects of mitigating the pandemic’s health 415
consequences. We present the empirical estimates from a specification to test whether 416
changes in distance traveled, non-essential visits, and encounter rates 1 and 2 weeks (7 417
and 14 days) prior have an effect on current health outcomes, controlling for day-to-day 418
changes common to all states and state-specific factors affecting health outcomes, and 419
distinguishing between mandate and non-mandate states. The inclusion of lagged effects 420
for the prior week allows us to measure the cumulative long-term impact of reducing 421
activity two weeks prior, controlling for changes in activity one week prior. Given that 422
the four early mandates were implemented two weeks prior to the end of our sample 423
period, our estimates are an average of the effects of behavioral changes that occurred 424
early in the COVID-19 pandemic as well as after states began implementing health 425
policies. To the extent that we find a differential impact in early mandate states, this 426
provides preliminary evidence that stay-at-home mandates convey positive cumulative 427
long-term health impacts. 428
Prior reductions in average distance traveled on health outcomes 429
The results from the estimation of Eq 3 are presented in Table 3. Given that we use two 430
weeks’ lagged data on changes in distance traveled, our baseline is March 9th. The 431
day-to-day fixed effects therefore measure changes in the health outcomes common to 432
all states relative to March 9th. Column (1) presents the estimates for new daily 433
COVID-19 deaths per million residents by state while column (2) reports estimates for 434
COVID-19 hospitalizations per million. Changes in hospitalization and death rates 435
reflect a direct pathway through which reduced transmission due to decreased social 436
interaction could manifest. A positive coefficient indicates that predicted hospitalization 437
or death rates increase with more travel; as we primarily interpret results with respect 438
to decreases in distance traveled, a positive sign suggests declines in hospitalizations or 439
deaths for a reduction in travel activity or in-person social interaction. The first row 440
reports the coefficient on a change in average distance traveled 14 days prior for control 441
states, while ˙ADT 14 days prior X SAH Mandate reports the differential impact of a 442
one percentage point change in average distance traveled per day on health outcomes for 443
early adoption states. The following two rows report equivalent relationships for ˙ADT 444
one week prior. The date coefficients that follow report the change in average health 445
outcomes for the specified date, measured as a difference relative to the baseline date of 446
March 9. A positive estimate indicates relative daily trends of increased 447
hospitalizations/deaths, while a negative sign suggests declines in these outcomes. The 448
constant estimate is interpreted as the predicted “business-as-usual” level of 449
deaths/hospitalizations for a non-early mandate state on March 9th with no changes in 450
daily travel patterns for the prior weeks. Turning first to the results for deaths in 451
column (1), we see that, on average, deaths per million were 0.93 people more on March 452
23 than on March 9th (in the row March 23 Relative to March 9). Throughout the 453
sample period, deaths are on average increasing relative to baseline at a rate between 454
0.014 to 0.927 per million a day across all states. Looking in column (2), 455
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Table 3. Effect of changes in distances traveled on health outcomes from
COVID-19
Deaths Hospitalizations
Per Million Per Million
(1) (2)
˙ADT 14 days prior 0.006∗ -0.001
(0.003) (0.034)
˙ADT 14 days prior X SAH Mandate 0.069∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.098)
˙ADT 7 days prior -0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.030)
˙ADT 7 days prior X SAH Mandate -0.040∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.072)
March 10 relative to March 9 0.014 0.053
(0.122) (1.204)
...
March 16 relative to March 9 0.140 2.518∗∗
(0.123) (1.207)
March 17 relative to March 9 0.252∗∗ 1.012
(0.123) (1.211)
March 18 relative to March 9 0.324∗∗∗ 0.802
(0.124) (1.219)
March 19 relative to March 9 0.355∗∗∗ 1.510
(0.127) (1.249)
March 20 relative to March 9 0.441∗∗∗ 2.524∗
(0.138) (1.358)
March 21 relative to March 9 0.603∗∗∗ 5.153∗∗∗
(0.130) (1.275)
March 22 relative to March 9 0.843∗∗∗ 4.675∗∗∗
(0.127) (1.254)
March 23 relative to March 9 0.927∗∗∗ 3.920∗∗∗
(0.126) (1.243)
...
Constant -0.004 -0.027
(0.087) (0.852)
Num of Obs. 1377 1377
R squared 0.388 0.284
AIC 15.455 4.860
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Note: this table reports estimates of the model in Eq 3 where the
dependent variables are COVID-19-related deaths or hospitalizations
in a given state, scaled per million population. Change in distance
traveled is denoted by ˙ADT . State and date fixed effects are included
in both columns.
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hospitalizations on March 23 are also significantly higher relative to March 9th. 456
Throughout the sample period, hospitalizations are also increasing relative to baseline 457
at average rates between 0.05 to 5.2 per million a day across all states on average. 458
Turning to the effect of changes in travel activity, we find evidence that reductions in 459
average travel distance several weeks prior for states that implemented mandates matter 460
for health outcomes. Looking at the estimated coefficients on the levels of ˙ADT weeks 461
prior across outcomes, we find evidence of past travel reductions two weeks prior being 462
correlated with 0.006 fewer deaths per million in late/no mandate states, and find no 463
significant effects for hospitalizations in control states after accounting for time trends. 464
In contrast, reductions in average distance traveled in early mandate states are 465
associated with statistically significant reductions in deaths and hospitalizations. In 466
mandate states, a one percentage point reduction in ˙ADT is associated with 0.069 fewer 467
deaths per million, given by the interaction between ˙ADT 14 days prior and 468
stay-at-home Mandate in column (1). The estimated cumulative effect of 469
−0.04 + 0.069 = 0.029 over lagged weeks is positive. The long-run effect displays strong 470
statistical significance, with an F statistic of 36.02 for the null hypothesis of the sum 471
being equal to zero (p-value of 0.00). For the average mandate effect of -5 for ˙ADT 472
found in column (1) of Table 2, this corresponds to a daily reduction of 0.35 deaths per 473
million after 2 weeks elapsed time relative to the counterfactual of no stay-at-home 474
mandate. Looking at the impact on hospitalizations in column (2), we find similar 475
evidence of significant effects in mandate states after only two weeks. We find a 476
relatively large effect for mandate states at the two week mark: for a one percentage 477
point reduction in ˙ADT for mandate states 14 days earlier, we estimate a decline in 478
daily hospitalizations of 0.474 per million per state. The corresponding long-term effect 479
for hospitalizations of 0.474 − 0.23 = 0.244 proves statistically significant with an F 480
statistic of 25.12 and a p-value of 0.00. This means that a reduction in average distance 481
traveled by one percentage point in states with early mandates has a significant 482
long-term impact on daily hospitalizations, estimated to be 0.244 fewer people per 483
million. For a five percentage point reduction in travel distance, this corresponds to a 484
1.22 fewer daily hospitalizations following implementation of a stay-at-home mandate. 485
Prior reductions in visits to non-essential businesses on health outcomes 486
Focusing now on changes in visits to non-essential businesses ( ˙NEV ), we present the 487
results from the estimation of Eq 4 in Table 4. The regressions are comparable to those 488
presented in Table 4, and measure the effect of changes in NEV on deaths or 489
hospitalizations per million residents and include state and date fixed effects in all 490
columns (here we omit the date fixed effects for brevity). Once again we find evidence of 491
long-term health benefits following reductions in non-essential travel for early mandate 492
states. A one percentage point reduction in ˙NEV two weeks prior is associated with 493
0.025 fewer deaths and 0.194 fewer hospitalizations per million in early mandate states. 494
The estimated cumulative effect for daily deaths of −0.014 + 0.025 = 0.01 over lagged 495
weeks is positive. This long-run effect displays strong statistical significance, with an F 496
statistic of 13.7 for the null hypothesis of the sum being equal to zero (p-value of 0.00). 497
For the average mandate effect found in Table 2 of -5 percentage points, this corresponds 498
to a reduction of 0.05 daily deaths per million after 2 weeks elapsed time relative to the 499
counterfactual of no stay-at-home mandate. The corresponding long-term effect for 500
hospitalizations of 0.194 − 0.07 = 0.08 also proves statistically significant, with an F 501
statistic of 16.81 and a p-value of 0.00. This means that a reduction in non-essential 502
travel by one percentage point in states with early mandates has a significant long-term 503
impact on daily hospitalizations, estimated to be 0.08 fewer people per million. 504
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Table 4. Effect of changes in non-essential travel on health outcomes from
COVID-19
(1) (2)
Deaths Hospitalizations
Per Million Per Million
˙NEV 14 days prior 0.006 0.001
(0.004) (0.036)
˙NEV 14 days prior X SAH Mandate 0.025∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.046)
˙NEV 7 days prior -0.008∗∗ -0.033
(0.004) (0.036)
˙NEV 7 days prior X SAH Mandate -0.014∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.004) (0.036)
Constant 0.005 -0.112
(0.091) (0.891)
Num of Obs. 1377 1377
R squared 0.380 0.281
AIC 14.654 4.615
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Note: this table reports estimates of the model in Eq 4 where the
dependent variables are COVID-19-related deaths or hospitalizations
in a given state, scaled per million population. Change in non-essential
visits is denoted by ˙NEV . State and date fixed effects are included in
both columns.
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Prior reductions in changes in human encounter rates weeks on health 505
outcomes 506
Finally, we present evidence of changes in social distancing behavior on COVID-19 507
health outcomes in Table 5. Estimates of Eq 5 for daily COVID-19 deaths are once 508
again presented in column (1), and for daily hospitalizations in column (2). If the 509
observed reductions in social encounters with others due to stay-at-home mandates have 510
an effect on COVID-19 transmission rates, we would expect to observe reductions in 511
death and hospitalization rates following these mandates. Once again, we find evidence
Table 5. Effect of changes in human encounter rates on health outcomes
from COVID-19
(1) (2)
Deaths Hospitalizations
˙ENC 7 days prior -0.001 -0.004
(0.001) (0.005)
˙ENC X SAH Mandate -0.004∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006)
˙ENC 14 days prior 0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.005)
˙ENC 14 days prior X SAH Mandate 0.005∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.007)
Constant -0.008 -0.090
(0.085) (0.863)
Num of Obs. 1350 1350
R squared 0.429 0.293
AIC 19.455 5.427
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Note: this table reports estimates of the model in Eq 4 where the
dependent variables are COVID-19-related deaths or hospitalizations in
a given state, scaled per million population. Change in unique human
encounters per square kilometer is denoted by ˙ENC. State and date
fixed effects are included in both columns.
512
to suggest that prior reductions in human encounter rates (i.e. increased social 513
distancing) matter for mitigating the negative health consequences of COVID-19. The 514
estimated cumulative effect for daily deaths of 0.006 − 0.005 = 0.001 over lagged weeks 515
is positive. The long-run effect displays statistical significance, with an F statistic of 516
7.14 for the null hypothesis of the sum being equal to zero (p-value of 0.01). For the 517
average mandate effect found in Table 2 for the change in encounter rate of -236, this 518
corresponds to a reduction of 0.236 daily deaths per million after 2 weeks elapsed time 519
relative to the counterfactual of no stay-at-home mandate. Looking at the impact on 520
hospitalizations in column (2), we find that a reduction in human encounter rates two 521
weeks prior is correlated with a reduction in hospitalizations of 0.031 per million, while 522
the long term effect of −0.027 + 0.031 = −0.004 proves statistically indistinguishable 523
from zero with an F statistic of 2.1 and a p-value of 0.17. 524
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Conclusion 525
Temporarily closing non-essential businesses and mandating residents stay at home 526
except for essential activity is the prime policy instrument currently employed by states 527
to promote social distancing and slow the transmission of COVID-19. If effective, these 528
policies will reduce strain on the medical system and provide much-needed time for the 529
development of pharmaceutical treatments that can reduce transmission rates and end 530
the pandemic. If unsuccessful, states will incur large economic costs with few lives saved. 531
Whether these mandates cause people to stay at home and engage in social distancing is 532
a key requirement of a successful policy. Knowing whether such policies will have their 533
intended effect is of increasing policy relevance as more and more states adopt such 534
policies. Understanding if and how individuals reduce travel activity in response to 535
stay-at-home mandates and maintain social distance is the primary empirical question 536
we tackle in this paper. First, we find evidence that adoption of state-level stay-at-home 537
mandates have significantly reduced the travel activity of and human encounters 538
experienced by individuals subject to the police. We estimate a reduction in average 539
distance traveled of 5 percentage points, a decline n visits to non-essential businesses of 6 540
percentage points, and a decrease in unique human encounters of 236 percentage points. 541
These effects are present regardless of the comparison group used or the specific measure 542
analyzed. The estimated magnitudes are large relative to the trends in reductions 543
observed for the sample period, suggesting that, importantly, residents subject to 544
stay-at-home mandates are on average responding as desired to curb the spread of 545
COVID-19. Our empirical approach isolates the mandate effect from other drivers of 546
daily changes in travel activity levels and controls for a host of potential confounding 547
factors that differ between states that adopted early policies relative to other states. 548
Linking changes in travel activity and social distancing to health outcomes, we find 549
evidence that these reductions help “flatten the curve” and reduce health consequences 550
in early mandate states. We find that, on average, a one percentage point decrease in 551
average distance traveled per day in early-adopter states is associated with 0.24 fewer 552
hospitalizations and 0.03 fewer deaths per million per day. For a state with a 553
population of 20 million (the average population for all four early adoption states 554
rounded to the nearest million), this corresponds to 0.6 (0.03 × 20) fewer predicted 555
deaths per day for a one percentage point reduction in average distance traveled. Given 556
that, on average, individuals in early adopter states reduced their daily travel by 5 557
percentage points relative to pre-COVID-19 levels due to the mandates, this implies an 558
effect of roughly 3 fewer deaths per day as a result of behavioral changes of these 559
magnitudes two weeks earlier (0.6 × 5) . Using the Environmental Protection Agency’s 560
central estimate of $7.4 million for the value of a statistical life [42], this reflects a 561
savings of $22.4 million per day due to avoided COVID-19 deaths (3 × $7.4). We find 562
similar evidence of health benefits due to reduced visits to non-essential businesses, with 563
0.01 fewer daily deaths and 0.08 fewer daily hospitalizations per million for a one 564
percentage point decrease in non-essential visits. This corresponds to 0.2 fewer daily 565
deaths for the average early adopter (0.01 × 20.2) and a mandate effect of 1.2 fewer 566
daily deaths (0.02× 6), or a $9 million per day savings (1.2× $7.4). Looking at our 567
measure of social distancing, we find that a one percentage point reduction in human 568
encounters is associated with 0.001 fewer daily deaths per million. This is equivalent to 569
0.02 fewer daily deaths for the average early mandate state (0.001× 20.02), and a 570
stay-at-home mandate effect of 4.8 fewer daily deaths (0.02 × 236). This reduction 571
conveys a monetary benefit of $35.5 million per day due to avoided COVID-19 deaths 572
from reduced contact two weeks prior (4.8 × $7.4). In total, avoided deaths from all 573
three pathways have a $66.9 million benefit per day for mandate states; when 574
aggregated to reflect the direct health benefits from just a two-week long mandate, the 575
value increases to $936.6 million per state every two weeks. 576
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Our estimates do not take into account the benefits from avoided hospitalizations 577
and other indirect health benefits from reduced travel activity and social distancing. As 578
reductions in travel distance and increased social distance likely decrease exposure to 579
other potentially deadly illnesses, this is likely an underestimation of the overall health 580
benefit of these policies. Further, the patterns in under-reporting and under-counting of 581
COVID-19 deaths provide further evidence that we underestimate the direct benefits of 582
these policies. Widespread lack of access to testing, especially in rural areas and early 583
on in the U.S. outbreak, means many deaths (especially at-home deaths) due to 584
respiratory issues cause by COVID-19 may have gone uncounted [43]. Future 585
identification of additional COVID-19 deaths may prove difficult, as many death 586
certificates list only the immediate cause of death and fail to report underlying diseases – 587
likely understating the presence of COVID-19 [44]. Further, procedures for counting 588
COVID-19 deaths may be correlated with adoption of stay-at-home mandates. If 589
adoption of a state-level ordinance indicates additional preparedness on the part of the 590
adopting state, then states that were slower to (or have yet to) pass stay-at-home 591
mandates may also be slower to properly attribute deaths to COVID-19, resulting in 592
our estimated effects being understatements of the true effect. Given the challenges to 593
proper identification of COVID-19 deaths we may not know the true death count for 594
years, or ever. As a result it may not ever be possible to determine the exact loss of life 595
due to COVID-19, and accordingly we heed caution in interpreting our result as 596
capturing a de-facto relationship. Our estimated policy effects are currently based on 597
the stay-at-home ordinances implemented in California, Illinois, New Jersey, and New 598
York and the observed behavioral responses to their mandates. Our projections of 599
cumulative benefits for a two-week (or longer) mandate rely on the assumption that 600
residents of these states maintain reduced travel activity and continue current levels of 601
social distancing. As more time elapses since the implementation of these policies, 602
researchers will be able to gain a better understanding of whether residents to these 603
policies grow fatigued and return to previous habits after extensive time spent at home. 604
Incorporating future data from the coming weeks will allow a greater understanding of 605
whether the effects we find currently are generalizable to the political and social climates 606
of other states. Further, understanding the economic forces and psychological incentives 607
behind compliance with stay-at-home mandates is complex, and additional work is 608
needed that can characterize the mechanisms behind the policy effects we observe. 609
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